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A Philosophical Basis
of Medical Practice: Toward a Philosophy
and Ethic of the Healing Professions
Edmund D. Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma
Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1981, xviii + 341 pp., $19.95.
This is an ambitious and formidable book. In it, the authors undertake nothing
less thart a complete philosophy of medicine. The basis for this philosophy is not
any philosophical system, but a careful analysis of medical practice itself. The
central focus is on the clinical interaction between patient and physician. The
conditions and implications of this interpersonal event define medicine and
provide a perspective on the central personal and institutional issues which
modern medicine faces. Thus, the book is divided into three parts: the first seeks
an understanding of medicine; the second makes use of the first to develop the
ethical standards which should govern the physician's dealings with his or her
patients; and the third treats the implications of the first part for the social ethics
of medical care.
The second and third parts of the book do not deal in detail with the casuistical problems on which much medical-moral literature has focused in recent
years. Instead, they provide a frequently novel, practical perspective on the general normative and institutional issues which must be faced by physicians and by
society at large. Thus, in Part II the authors provide an account of the need for
discretionary space for the responsible practice of medicine, and of the contemporary tendencies to constrict this space. This concern is balanced by a thorough
critique of the paternalism of Hippocratic medical ethics. In its place, the authors
argue for an ethics which recognizes the autonomy of the patient. Insuring the
moral agency of the patient is a moral requirement of good medical practice,
based particularly on the vulnerable condition of the patient.
In Part II, the authors deal with (among other things) the moral obligations of
institutions, and the moral responsibilities of medical teams and their members.
These questions have been largely overlooked in recent literature. It is a merit of
the systematic character of this work that it brings these issues to light and provides thoughtful, if not final, responses to them.
The foundation for these provocative and helpful ethical discussions is in the
first part of the book. Unfortunately, this part is very difficult. The opening chapters are hampered by rather abstract and obscure discussions of the nature of
philosophy and of the complex interrelations between philosophy and medicine.
Moreover, the argumentation in t his part is not as clear and p rec ise as one expects
in contemporary American ethical writing. The effect is that one is leftsometimes at crucial points - wondering exactly what the authors mean to assert.
However, the obscurities of the beginning of the book and the difficulties of
philosophical style throughout much of Part I should not put the reader off. The
former do not prevent understanding of the central claims of the book; the latter
are gradually clarified , especially by useful summaries throughout the second and
third parts.
The discussion of the nature of medicine begins with the old question whether
medicine is an art or a science. The authors argue that, while it has features of
both, it is a unitary discipline which is reducible to neither. Medicine incorporates
knowledge of the biological sciences but has a practical goal - the healing of the
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individual patient. Furthermore, it differs from other activities having restorative
aims by the way it seeks to achieve this goal, namely, the clinical interaction. This
interaction is fundamentally a healing relationship into which physician and
patient enter. The character of this relationship reveals that medicine is both a
moral enterprise and a form of craftsmanship that involves healing the body with
the body. Health and disease are bodily realities which have an evaluative function . The clinical interaction begins with a patient's recognition of disease, and
attempts to restore the former order and organic balance of good health. This
restoration is effected with and through the body of the individual patient. On the
basis of such considerations as these, the authors propose the following definition
of medicine: "A relation of mutual consent to effect individualized well-being by
working in, with, and through the body" (p. 80).
The remainder of Part I elaborates themes taken up here. The authors discuss
the epistemological issues raised by the fact that medicine, while rooted in
science, is concerned with understanding and curing the individual patient. This
concern for the individual makes it impossible to und erstand medicine simply as a
science. The objectification of the human body and its maladies, which the scientific character of medicine presupposes, can falsify one's understanding of
medicine if not balanced by a recognition of the "wisdom of the body" of each
unique patient. Thus, the authors believe : "Clinical judgments must be a complex
process of perceiving individual uniqueness in the midst of common objectivities"
(p. 110). In "The Anatomy of Clinical Judgments," perhaps the richest and most
ph ilosophically interesting chapter in the book, the au thors make clear in a
remarkably concrete way how the clinical judgments which are at the heart of
medical practice are made and can be criticized. They show that concern for the
uniqueness of each patient does not require that medicine be an art in the sense of
an intuitive grasp of a situation which is non-rational and beyond logical criticism.
The right clinical judgment is the result of a clinical reasoning process which,
although it is complex and includes logically heterogeneous elements, can be
logically evaluated in the light of appropriate norms of rationality. The final step
in this process - the step from determining what can be done to what should be
done for the individual patient - involves explicitly rhetorical and ethical considerations. At this stage the values and concerns of the patient have an important
role and, therefore, the physician must be careful not to unduly influence the
patient's decision.
The preceding summary of some of the central themes of this book cannot do
justice to the richness of insigh t and balance of judgment it evinces. Thus, even
though there are many specific points one might criticize, and even though one
might desire greater clarity and rigor throughout, this book makes a significant
contribution to the understanding of medicine. The focus on the actual practice
of medicine, the unified perspective provided by this focus, and the richness of
detail are likely to be instructive for anyone who wants to understand medicine as
it is practiced today.
- Joseph M. Boyle, Jr.
College of St. Thomas
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